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Abstract 
In the 2ist century, many parts of our daily life have already been digitized. The ways 
of performing commercial activities are also changing. We can now go to the web for 
on-line shopping. We can go to the website of a bank to do some financial 
transactions. We can go to the website of our government to pay for taxes and apply 
for services. We call these kinds of digital commercial activities “Electronic 
Commerce". 
Among the field of e-commerce, security is a main concern. Cryptographic 
primitives are needed to build up a secure environment. In this thesis, we make a 
thorough study on these primitives such as public-key cryptography and digital 
certificate. A new public-key algorithm elliptic curve cryptosystem is also introduced. 
Besides, we also make details description of two media generally used in e-commerce, 
namely smart card and electronic cash. 
Our contributions also focus on these two media. The first one we proposed is 
called Smart Card Certificate System and the second one is called Recoverable and 



















1. Introduction 1 
1.1 Security and E-commerce 3 
1.2 E-commerce: More than Commercial Activities 4 
1.3 What This Thesis Contains 5 
2. Introduction to Cryptographic Theories 7 
2.1 Six Cryptographic Primitives 7 
2.1.1 Symmetric Encryption 8 
2.1.2 Asymmetric Encryption 8 
2.1.3 Digital Signature 9 
2.1.4 Message Digest 9 
2.1.5 Digital Certificate and Certificate Authority 10 
2.1.6 Zero-Knowledge Proof 11 
2.2 The RSA Public Key Cryptosystem 12 
2.3 The ElGamal Public Key Encryption Scheme 13 
2.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem 14 
V 
2.4.1 The Algorithm of Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem 15 
2.5 Different kinds of Digital Signature 16 
2.5.1 RSA Digital Signature 16 
2.5.2 Elliptic Curve Nyberg-Rueppel Digital Signature 16 
2.6 Blind Signature 17 
2.7 Cut-and-choose protocol 18 
2.8 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 19 
3. Introduction to E-commerce, M-commerce and 
Rich Media M-commerce 20 
3.1 ist Generation of E-commerce 21 
3.2 2nd Generation of E-commerce — M-commerce 21 
3.3 3rd Generation of E-commerce - Rich Media M-commerce 23 
3.4 Payment Systems used in E-commerce 23 
3.4.1 Electronic Cash 23 
3.4.2 Credit Card 24 
3.4.3 Combined Payment System 24 
4. Introduction to Smart Card 25 
4.1 What is Smart Card? 25 
4.2 Advantages of Smart Cards 26 
4.2.1 Protable Device 26 
4.2.2 Multi-applications 26 
4.2.3 Computation Power 26 
4.2.4 Security Features 27 
vi 
4.3 What can Smart Cards Do? 27 
4.4 Java Card 28 
5. A New Smart Card Certificate System 30 
5.1 Introduction  
5.2 Comparison between RSA and ECC 32 
5.3 System Architecture 33 
5.3.1 System Setup 33 
5.3.2 Apply for a certificate 34 
5.3.3 Verification of Alice 35 
5.3.4 Other Certificates — the "Hyper-Link" concept 36 
5.3.4.1 Generation of the "hyper-link" 37 
5.3.4.2 Verification ofAlice using the ‘‘hyper-link,’ 37 
5.3.5 Multiple Applications 38 
5.4 Security Analysis 39 
5.4.1 No Crypto-processor is needed 40 
5.4.2 PIN Protect 40 
5.4.3 Digital Certificate Protect 40 
5.4.4 Private Key is never left the smart card 41 
5.5 Extensions 41 
5.5.1 Biometrics Security 41 
5.5.2 E-Voting 41 
5.6 Conclusion 42 
6. Introduction to Electronic Cash 44 
vii 
6.1 Introduction 44 
6.2 The Basic Requirements 45 
6.3 Advantages of Electronic Cash over other kinds of payment systems 46 
6.3.1 Privacy 46 
6.3.2 Off-line payment 47 
6.3.3 Suitable for Small Amount Payment 47 
6.4 Basic Model of Electronic Cash 48 
6.5 Examples of Electronic Cash 49 
6.5.1 eCash 49 
6.5.2 Mondex 49 
6.5.3 Octopus Card 50 
7. A New Recoverable and Untraceable Electronic 
Cash 51 
7.1 Introduction 52 
7.2 The Basic Idea 52 
7.3 S, Brand's Single Term E-cash Protocol 54 
7.3.1 The Setup of the System 54 
7.3.2 The Withdrawal Protocol 54 
7.3.3 The Payment Protocol 55 
7.3.4 The Deposit Protocol 56 
7.4 The Proposed Protocol 57 
7.4.1 The Withdrawal Protocol 57 
7.4.2 The Payment Protocol 58 
7.4.3 The Deposit Protocol 58 
viii 
7.4.4. The Recovery Protocol 59 
7.5 Security Analysis 60 
7.5.1 Conditional Untraceability 60 
7.5.2 Cheating 60 
7.6 Extension 60 
7.7 Conclusion 62 
8. Conclusion 63 





In the past, when the deadline of a payment (such as electricity bill or government tax) 
comes, there are many people lining in the queue of the payment service. The waiting 
time varies from a few minutes to an hour. It really wastes a lot of time. Later there is 
auto-pay service such that the electricity company or the government credits the 
user's account at a fixed time. But some people think that it is not good enough 
because they are afraid the company may overcharge them. They still want to pay the 
bill by themselves, yet they do not want to waste any time in the waiting queue. 
Recently they can have a way to achieve their goal. Now there are many method of 
payment, such as using digital telephone, WAP (wireless application protocol, used in 
mobile phone for Internet access), WWW etc. 
Digital! We are now living in the Digital world. Nowadays many parts of our 
daily life have converted into the digital domain. Mobile phone, personal computer, 
digital camera, digital video (DV) recorder, mp3 player etc... Even the ways of 
communication between people are digital — using the Internet. Email, world wide 
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web (WWW), wireless application protocol (WAP), ICQ etc. They are the ways that 
people use to communicate with each other and obtain the newest information. 
Commercial activities are also digitized. We call this kind of activity Electronic 
Commerce. 
Let us look into the new model for organizational e-commerce. There are three 
different viewpoints [33]: 
1. The new organization, which was bom on the Internet in the e-commerce 
market-space. 
2. Established organization traditionally in an offline market-space now move to 
the Internet. 
3. Organizations that are coming together in a new format the e-consortia 
partnerships are made through the "virtual structure” of an online 
organization. 
y / ^ Established Organizations 
/ Total Market \ 
/ 1 \ 
I f。一 vr / 
\ E-commerce ^ ^ ^^^ / 
\ \ Market-Space ( E-consortium ) / 
Figure 1.1 Established, online, and consortium 
organizations in the market-space. 
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In Figure 1.1 [33]，we can clearly see that the e-commerce market-space is 
expanding. To become successfully in the e-commerce market-space, technology is a 
key factor. Among all the technology, security is the most important part of it. 
Without security, people will have no trust in the electronic systems and all the 
business will fail. 
1.1 Security and E-commerce 
In the paper cash commercial model, security is already a necessary factor people 
concerned. The security of each bank is higher than other shops. Extra cost or 
manpower is needed when transferring the money from one place to another. It is the 
same in the electronic domain. In e-commerce, we talk about data security instead of 
physical security. 
Try to imagine that if the following cases happen: 
1. The web server of your company is hacked by someone, and all the 
information of your customer is stolen. 
2. The customer's credit card number is known by someone else during the 
transmission from his own computer to the web server. 
3. A customer uses the e-banking service of a bank. Unfortunately, the password 
he typed during the online transaction of account is captured by someone. 
The result is very serious. More importantly, customers will have no confidence in 
doing e-business or getting e-service because they think that it is insecure and they 
may have a high risk in doing that. Therefore, we can see that the foundation of 
e-commerce is security. Everything is built on top of it. If the foundation is not good 
enough, the whole e-commerce model will collapse. 
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Art Coviello, CEO of RSA Security, believe that "companies are realizing PKJ 
can enable key business applications". He also has a positive prediction over the IT 
security industries despite the economy slowdown, “of all the categories in IT 
spending, security is the one last category that will likely be one of the last places to 
be cut, if cut at all" [34]. Furthermore, according to [34], "for the first time, security 
interests and business interests are aligned". We can find many real time example, 
such as Oracle Mobile is working with Sonera Corp subsidiary, SmartTrust, to add 
wireless PKI functions to the wireless version of Oracle's 9i database [34]. Certicom 
'35], a company selling Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem product, has already had alliance 
with Motorola [36] to provide the market with advanced levels of security for trusted 
wireless transactions. This is the "E-consortium" that we have shown in Figure 1.1 
1.2 E-commerce: More than Commercial Activities 
While e-commerce plays an important role in the society, its innovations are not only 
limited to commercial activities. B2B (business-to-business) and B2C 
(business-to-customer) are the most common models of e-commerce. Yet there are 
also other kinds of model. B2G (business-to-govemment), G2B 
(govemment-to-business) or even G2C (govemment-to-customer or citizen) are those 
newly developed models. 
B2G can be further subdivided into horizontal market and vertical market [33；. 
For the horizontal market, Grainger [37], a company in the United State, has created 
its market-space across the U.S. Federal and State/Local government agencies. For the 
vertical B2G portal, they provide a specialized service to fill a special need of the 
government, such as processing of passport or fingerprints for the immigration 
department. 
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G2B and G2C can be discussed together because their properties are very similar. 
When the government provides an electronic service to fulfill the requests for 
information from business, it can be regarded as G2B. If the target of the service is 
citizen, it can be regarded as G2C. 
Recently, the Hong Kong SAR Government also focuses on the G2C systems. 
We can now go to the website of the HKSAR Government [38] to download 
application forms or documentation, to apply for a driving or car license, to report 
criminal activities, to get the most updated news or report from the government, to 
apply for some government jobs etc. The ESDLife (Electronic Service Delivery Life) 
is a new service provided by the HKSAR Government to enable citizen to do different 
kinds of electronic services. It aims to deliver high quality public services to the 
community in an innovative manner; to improve the efficiency and reduce the cost of 
delivery of public services; and to foster the development of electronic commerce in 
the HKSAR [40]. How about in the U.S. side? On 7 March 2000, the first official 
Internet voting was conducted in Arizona! Citizen are no longer need to go to the 
voting center which maybe very far away from their home. They can use any 
computer to execute their citizen right — to vote for their representatives. 
Yet no matter it is B2B, B2C, B2G, G2B or G2C, security is also the mam 
concern. Especially in the G2C model, authentication and privacy are the two major 
worries of the government and the citizen respectively. We have to put some security 
protocols in order to strengthen the G2C model. Security is still the key factor, no 
matter which model it belongs to. 
1.3 What This Thesis Contains 
This thesis emphasizes on the topic of electronic commerce, especially in a technical 
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point of view. We are going to discuss the cryptographic aspect of e-commerce 
protocols. 
This thesis is organized as follow. In Chapter 2, cryptographic primitives such as 
symmetric cipher, asymmetric cipher, digital signature, message digest, 
zero-knowledge proof, digital certificate, RSA Public Key Cryptosystem, Elliptic 
Curve Cryptosystem, Blind Signature and the Cut-and-Choose Protocol are explained. 
In additional to the theory, the trend of e-commerce is also described in Chapter 3. We 
also discuss the different kinds of payment system used in e-commerce. 
In Chapter 4, we discuss about smart card. The nature and the advantage of smart 
cards are discussed. We also introduce Java Card. Through this chapter, we can obtain 
a more clear picture of smart card, which is used in one of our proposed system. 
In Chapter 5，the first proposed application is discussed. It is a smart card system 
using elliptic curve cryptosystem as the public key algorithm. Various security 
features are included, such as multiple certificates system. 
Besides smart card, e-cash is another research area of my studies. We give a 
brief introduction of e-cash in Chapter 6. In this chapter, the idea of e-cash and the 
main advantages of e-cash are given. We also briefly describe the basic model of 
e-cash. 
In Chapter 7，we propose a new concept of e-cash: recoverable and untraceable 
e-cash. It allows the user to get back his lost e-cash, yet at the same time, the e-cash 
remains untraceable. 
There are two publications derived from this thesis. Namely “Multi-Application 
Smart Card with Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem Certificate'' derived from Chapter 5 and 
"Recoverable and Untraceable E-cash “ derived from Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2 
Introduction to Cryptographic 
Theories 
Cryptography is a kind of science of keeping the message secret [1]. Cryptography 
deals with all aspects of secure messaging, authentication, digital signatures, 
electronic money, and other applications. Hundreds or even thousands years ago, 
cryptographic systems were employed in military organizations to keep message 
secret. At the end of the century, cryptologies were used in global 
communications and commercial applications. Nowadays, people like to do their 
business in the electronic domain. In the world of electronic commerce, people 
heavily employ dozens of cryptographic techniques and methodologies in order to 
attain the security, one of the very important elements of electronic commerce. 
In this chapter, we will talk about the fundamental theories that are involved in 
applications mentioned in this thesis. 
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2.1 Six Cryptographic Primitives 
At the basic level of cryptography, there are six cryptographic primitives: 
2.1.1 Symmetric Encryption 
In a symmetric encryption scheme, the encryption key is the same as the decryption 
key. A message can be decrypted only if the key matches the encryption key. That is, 
Ek(P) 二 C 
Dk(C) = P 
Dk(Ek( P )) = P 
Where P = plaintext 
C = ciphertext 
k = encryption / decryption key 
In order to do encryption, two parties should get an agreement on the encryption 
key before they start their communication. 
The most famous examples of the symmetric encryption include Data Encryption 
Standard (DES) [2, 3], Triple DES [4] and the International Data Encryption 
Algorithm (IDEA) [5]. 
2.1.2 Asymmetric Encryption 
In an asymmetric encryption, the encryption key is different from the decryption key. 
That is, 
Eki(P) = C 
D,2(C) = P 
Dk2(Eki(P)) 二 P 
such that ki , k!. It is important that the decryption key cannot (practically) be 
8 
derived from the encryption key. Each user has a key pair — private key and public key. 
The private key should be kept secret while the public key should be published and let 
other people know. If Alice wants to send an encrypted message to Bob, she has to 
use Bob's public key to encrypt the message. When Bob receives the encrypted 
message, he has to use his private key to decrypt it. It can also be used to do key 
exchange or key agreement. After getting the key agreement, users can use symmetric 
encryption to communicate. 
Asymmetric encryption is also known as public key encryption. Examples 
include RSA [6] and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) [7, 8]. We will discuss the 
detail algorithm of RSA and ECC in chapter 2.2 and 2.3. 
2.1.3 Digital Signature 
Digital Signature is similar to handwritten signature, but instead of signing a paper 
document, digital signature is used to sign an electronic document. A digital signature 
should contain the following properties: [9: 
1. Authentic. Signature convinces the recipient that it is signed by the signer. 
2. Unforgeable. Only the signer can sign, no one else can sign the document. 
3. Not reusable. The signature is part of the document, and therefore cannot 
move to another different document. 
4. Unalterable. After signing the document, the signer cannot alter. 
5. Cannot be repudiated. After signing the document, the signer cannot later 
claim that he did not sign it. 
If Alice wants to send a signed message to Bob, she has to use her private key to 
sign the document. When Bob received this document together with the signature, he 
has to use Alice's public key to verify it. 
We will talk about different kinds digital signature schemes in chapter 2.5. 
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2.1.4 Message Digest 
It is also know as one-way hash function. The purpose of a hash function is to 
produce a "fingerprint" of a file, message, or other block of data. In order to fulfill this 
purpose, a hash function H(x) must have the following properties: 
1. H(x) can be applied to a block of data of any size. 
2. H(x) produces a fixed length output no matter the size of the input data. 
3. H(x) is easy to compute for any given x. 
4. It is a one-way function. That is, it is computationally infeasible to find x 
given h such that H(x) = h . 
5. It is a collision-resistant function. That is, it is computationally infeasible to 
find y X such that H(x) = H(y). 
The first three properties ensure the hash function can be put into practical application. 
The forth property ensures no one can guess the message from the message digest. 
The last one guarantees that an alternative message hashing to the same value as a 
given message cannot be found. If many different messages map to one single value, 
this hash function loses its significance. 
It is mainly used in producing digital signature. The two famous hash functions 
are Secure Hash Algorithm-1 (SHA-1) and MD-5. The former hashing algorithm 
produces a 160-bit hash-value while the latter algorithm produces a 128-bit output. 
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2.1.5 Digital Certificate and Certificate Authority 
Certificate Authority's 
User's Identification — a t e key 
Information 
“ C N 
User's public key ] K Generate Digital 
U � Signature 
Certificate Authority's I, ^ 
Name 
Certificate Authority's ^ ^ J 
Digital Signature ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Figure 2.1 
The above figure (figure 2.1) shows the structure of a digital certificate. The 
certificate contains user's personal information, his public key and most importantly, 
the Certificate Authority's signature. The Certificate Authority (CA) is a third party 
that can be trusted, such as Microsoft, VISA and MasterCard. If anyone wants to 
receive data from his friend, he only needs to present his certificate to his friend, then 
his friend can get the public key which is then used to encrypt the data. 
In a large network system such as Internet, it is difficult to find your friend's 
public key. Without his public key, you cannot use the public key algorithm to 
communicate securely with him. If you ask him to send the public key to you, it is 
possible for hackers to "steal" his public key, instead sending the hacker's own public 
key to you. Therefore it is also not secure. 
Now instead of just sending the public key, your friend sends his certificate to 
you. You can then extract his public key from the certificate. This is a secure 
communication because although someone may also "steal" the certificate, he cannot 
make his own certificate because the CA's signature is required for a certificate. (The 
CA's public key can be found anywhere, or is embedded in famous software such as 
Windows.) 
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2.1.6 Zero-Knowledge Proof 
The certificate alone cannot confirm that the individual presenting the certificate as 
proof of identity is actually the right owner. Someone can pretend he is your friend 
and using your friend's information to ask the CA to give him a certificate. Therefore 
zero-knowledge proof is needed for authentication. It is also known as random 
challenge. It is used to authenticate the ownership of a user. The main idea is to prove 
that the user owns his private key without revealing it. The algorithm is as follow: 
Alice Bob 
Request Bob's cert. 
Alice checks for CA's ‘— ^ 
signature. If match, it — 
is OK. Alice then gets BS)'S cert. 
Bob's public key from 
his cert. 
Random generate x, 
—-~-___askBob to sign it. 明 
Alice using Bob's = signing( x) 
public key to check  
the signed x. 
Figure 2.2 
In this way, Bob can ensure Alice contains her own private key, that is, to authenticate 
the ownership of Alice's certificate, yet she does not reveal her private key to Bob. 
2.2 The RSA Public Key Cryptosystem 
The RSA Public Key [6] Cryptosystem is a widely used algorithm in modem 
cryptography. It is named for its inventors, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman. The 
algorithm is as follow: 
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1. First choose two large prime numbers p and q of equal length (about the same 
size). 
2. Calculate n = pq. 
3. Randomly choose an integer e such that gcd(e, (p-l)(q-l)) 二 1. 
4. Use extended Euclidean algorithm to find out an integer d such that 
de = 1 (mod(p-l)(q-l) ) or d' 二 e (mod (p-Dfc/-/)) 
5. The number n and e are the public-key, and the number d is the private key. 
6. To encrypt a message m , first divide it into a number of blocks smaller than n . 
7. The encryption formula is just: 
c = nf (mod n ) 
8. To decrypt a message, only need to calculate: 
m = c^ (mod n ) 
9. This algorithm works because: 
c"^ = (mod n ) 
=nfd (mod n ) 
=爪(動d n ) 
二 m( 1 )K(q-i) (mod p ) 二 m( 1 严)(mod q ) 
(by Fermat's Little Theorem: ct! 二 1 ( modp )) 
=m (mod pq ) = m (mod n ) 
(by Chinese Remainder Theorem: 
If X = y (modp) and x = y (mod q) 
then X = y (mod pq ) ) 
Therefore, the original message is recovered by this formula. 
The security o fRSA is based on factorizing the large number n. 
13 
2.3 The ElGamal Public Key Encryption Scheme 
The security of the ElGamal Public Key Encryption Scheme [24] is based on the 
difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem. The basic ElGamal encryption scheme is 
described as follow: 
1. First choose a prime number p and a generator a in Fp. 
2. Select a random integer a, such that I <a< p-2, and compute a" (mod p). 
3. The public key is (p, a, c f ) and the private key is a. 
If Bob wants to encrypts a message m to Alice: 
1. Obtain Alice's public key (p, a, a"). 
2. Choose a random integer k, such that \<k< p-2. 
3. Compute y = (mod p) and (5 = w (cf) “ (mod p). 
4. Send the ciphertext c = (y ,d)\o Alice. 
When Alice receives the message and wants to decrypt it: 
1. Use her private key a to recover m by computing (y'"�S (mod p). 
2. It works because 
(广)^ 二�a‘)m((fk) 二 m (mod p). 
2.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) 
Elliptic Curves were first suggested in 1985 by Victor Miller [8] and Neal Koblitz [7 
for implementing public key cryptosystem. The points on an elliptic curve E over a 
finite field K form an abelian group. The addition operation of this group is easy to 
implement. Moreover, the discrete logarithm problem in this group is believed to be 
very difficult, even much harder than the discrete logarithm problem in finite fields of 
the same size as AT [10]. 
Elliptic curves take the general form of the equation: 
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y^ + axy + by = x^ + cx^ + dx + e 
where a, b, c, d and e are real numbers satisfy some conditions which depends on the 
field it belongs to, such as real number or finite field. There is a point O called the 
point at infinity or the zero point. The basic operation of elliptic curve is addition. The 
addition of two distinct points on elliptic curve can be illustrated by the following 
figure [6]: 
>' F {,.2,35, •••1.86) 
Q (-0.1, 0.836) 
/7i … -li (3.89, 5.62) 
/ / i R (3.39, -5.62) 
. / / ； 




To double for a point P, it is equivalent to do P + P. Similarly, we can calculate 
3P = 2P + P and so on. One important property is that it is very difficult to find an 
integer n such that nP = Q. 
2.4.1 The Algorithm of Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem 
In order to use elliptic curve to do cryptographic operation, some basic setup is 
needed: 
1. Find a curve y^ = x^ + ax + b over Yq. (or over F2"') 
2. Find a point G 二（x。，y。）such that Order(G) = p which is a large prime number. 
(Order(G) is defined as p such that pG ^ O) 
3. The Curve( C ) and point G is known to everyone and can be shared by multiple 
user. 
4. Private key is an integer: 5 such that 1 < s < p. 
15 
5. Public key is a point on the Curve: S where S = sG, 
The security of ECC is based on how difficult to determine k given kP and P. 
This is referred to as the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). Based on 
the ECDLP, various kind of operation can be executed, such as encryption/decryption, 
key ex-change and digital signature. 
2.5 Different kinds of Digital Signature 
There exist many different kinds of digital signature. Here we are going to introduce 
those derived from RSA and ECC algorithms. 
2.5.1 RSA Digital Signature 
The RSA digital signature scheme is similar to the RSA encryption/decryption 
algorithm. Let d be the private key and e be the public key. The signature 5 on a 
message M using the private key d is 
s 二 M^ ( mod n ) 
To verify the signature, just need to check for the following equality using the public 
key e: 
s^ = M ( mod n ) 
2.5.2 Elliptic Curve Nyberg-Rueppel Digital Signature 
We are going to introduce an ECC digital signature scheme. In fact, it is just the 
Elliptic Curve version of the original Nyberg-Rueppel Digital Signature. The 
procedures are as follow: 
1. Setup all the parameters needed for ECC: the curve C, common point G, private 
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key s, public key S and modulus q. 
2. Let the message needed to be sign b e / . 
3. Randomly generate a key pair ( u, V=uG). Let V= {xy, yv). 
4. Calculate c=Xy+f( mod q ) 
5. Calculate d 二 u — sc (mod q) 
6.Output the pair ( c, J ) as the signature. 
The Signature Verification process is as follow: 
1. Calculate P = dG + cS { c, d are received from the sender, G is the common point 
on the curve, S is the public-key of the sender.) Let P = {xp, yp). 
2. Calculate f = c-Xp{ mod q ) 
3. Accept signer's signature for message if and only i f / ' = / 
2.6 Blind Signature 
Blind signature is a kind of digital signature such that the signer knows nothing about 
the message to be signed. The first blind signature is invented by David Chaum [13 ’ 
It is based on the RSA algorithm. 
Suppose Alice wants to obtain a blind signature from Bob for the message m. Let 
the private key of Bob be d and public key be e using modulus n. The algorithm is as 
follow: 
1. Alice choose a random integer r. 
2. Calculate 
M' = rM(modn) 
3. Bob signs on M' using his private key d\ 
M � ( / M f ( mod n ) 
and returns to Alice. 
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4. Alice unblinds M ^ by dividing M " with the divider r, 
5. An ordinary signature on M i s obtained: 
M" /r = (/Mf Ir =MUmodn) 
Using this algorithm, Alice can obtain an ordinary signature on the message M 
and at the same time, Bob cannot read M because it is blinded by the blinding factor r. 
But in this way, Alice can cheat easily by giving a false message to Bob for the 
signature. Therefore we have to use another technique called cut-and-choose protocol 
14] to protect Bob from cheating. We will discuss this protocol in the following 
section. 
2.7 Cut-and-choose protocol 
It is known as cut-and-choose mainly because it is similar to a classic protocol of 
dividing a cake fairly: 
1. Alice cuts the cake in half. 
2. Bob chooses one of the halves for himself. 
3. Alice takes the remaining half. 
This is the best way to obtain a fair result because Bob can choose whichever half 
he wants. By using the cut-and-choose protocol, the security problem stated above for 
the blind signature is solved. Bob can be protected from being cheated by Alice [15. 
The protocol is explained as follow: 
1. Alice chooses k random integers r, for i = 1 to k. 
2. She has to calculate: 
M，i = r i^M (mod n ) 
and submit all the kM'i to Bob. 
3. Bob randomly choose an integer j such that 1 <j <k and asks Alice to show 
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the value of r, for all i = 1 to k except j. 
4. Bob then verifies whether M'i = r / ^ M (mod n ) for all i = 1 to k excepty. 
5. If the verification is passed, Bob signs the unopened message M) and returns 
it to Alice. 
6. Alice unblinds M) by dividing M) using r； as the divider. 
7. Alice finally obtain a signature on M because 
M) d /rj = (rj /Vj = M^ (mod n ) 
In this way, we can see that Alice can cheat successfully only with the 
probability of 1/2^. It can be reduced by increasing the value oik. 
2.8 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
This is the first public-key algorithm invented [16]. Difference from RSA, it cannot 
be used to encrypt and decrypt messages. Instead, Alice and Bob can use this 
algorithm to exchange their secrete key and then they can use symmetric encryption 
for their secrete transmission. The algorithm is as follow: 
1. First Alice and Bob have to agree on two integers, n and g, such that 1 <g< n. 
2. Alice chooses a random integer 义 and calculate: 
X = g' (modn) 
3. Bob also chooses a random integer;^ and calculate: 
Y = g^ ( mod n ) 
4. Alice keeps x secrete and sends Xto Bob. Bob keeps secrete and sends Y to 
Alice. 
5. Alice computes k= (mod n) and Bob computes k' = (mod n ). 
6. We can note that k' = k = g"^ (mod n ). This is the common secrete derived by 
Alice and Bob. They can use this secrete to do symmetric encryption. 
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Chapter 3 
Introduction to E-commerce, 
M-commerce and Rich Media 
M-commerce 
Thousands years ago, people performed their trading activities by exchanging goods 
and services for other goods and services. However, this transaction method requires a 
double coincidence of wants. Therefore, after the invention of money, people began to 
use money as the media of doing business. 
The earliest money was the commodity money which included items such as 
seashells, tea and even tobacco. Later expensive metals such as gold and silver 
became the materials of money. In the modem world, paper money became more 
general. 
In the digital world nowadays, people like to move their business from the paper 
domain into the electronic domain. Various kinds of electronic payments systems are 
introduced, such as electronic money, credit card and debit card. These kinds of 
payments enhance the use of Internet or even the wireless mobile network to conduct 
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electronic commerce. 
In this chapter, we give a brief description of the trend of electronic commerce 
and some of the common payment systems used in doing e-commerce. 
3.1 ist Generation of E-commerce 
In the ist generation of e-commerce, people use their personal computers to go to the 
World Wide Web (WWW) to conduct commercial activities. They can go shopping 
from websites. They can also buy services from the web. They can even process 
financial transaction using the WWW, such as e-banking service from many banks. 
If people buy things or service from the web, they usually have to give their 
credit card number to the merchant through the web. If people want to make some 
transaction for their bank account, they even have to give their bank account password 
to the bank through the web. Try to think that if these information are captured by 
other people. They can pretend the owner to go shopping or even worse, transfer all 
the money from the owner's bank account to the hacker's back account. It seems very 
dangerous to do e-commerce without any security protection. 
Therefore, we can see the security is one of the main concerns of e-commerce. 
Solutions include adding some security protocol to the existing network, such as 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) [18] and Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) [19]. Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) including digital certificate should be used in order to 
support these protocol. 
3.2 2nd Generation of E-commerce - M-commerce 
During these years, the popularity of mobile phone has been increased rapidly. About 
10 years ago, people only used their mobile phone for voice communication. But 
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recently, as more mobile phones support data communication, more people try to use 
data communication services conducted by their mobile phones. This produces a 
suitable environment of doing commercial activities using mobile phones. We call this 
kind of commercial activities "mobile commerce" (or just for simple, 
"m-commerce"). 
The first kind of m-commerce activity is mainly based on SIM Tool Kit which 
can be regarded as the enhanced version of Short Message Service (SMS). The main 
service provided is mobile banking service. Customer can do their bank account 
transaction or enquiry through their mobile phone. But there are some restrictions, for 
example, each content provider (such as bank) has to make an agreement with the 
mobile service provider in order to let the subscribers to use SIM Took Kit to access 
the services provided by each content provider. When comparing to the WWW, it 
seems not to be a good choice of doing commercial activities. 
Since the birth of the first WAP phone, Nokia'^^ 7110 [19], a new media of doing 
m-commerce has been created. Wireless Application Protocol [20] (WAP) is similar 
to WWW. The main difference is that WAP is decided specific for mobile phones 
while WWW is for computers. Users can go to any URL they want to browse. It is an 
interactive communication. Therefore, many m-commerce applications can be 
developed based on WAP. 
Yet m-commerce developers face the same problem as e-commerce — security 
problem. In fact, it is much more difficult to deal with it for WAP because the 
processing power of a SIM card or a mobile phone is much less than a personal 
computer. It is very hard to do a 1024-bit encryption by just using the SIM card. 
Furthermore, implementing PKI is also not an easy job in the mobile world. In fact’ 
WAP version 1.1 does not support certificate system. The only encryption layer is 
Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTSL). Certificate system is only supported from 
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WAP version 1.2 beyond. 
3.3 3rd Generation of E-commerce 一 Rich Media 
M-commerce 
As the 3G mobile service will come to market this year，there is a revolution on the 
wireless data communication. High bandwidth provides a multimedia way of 
communication. Not only text, but also graphics, sound or even video can be 
transmitted. For the handheld device, not only mobile phones will be used. PDAs will 
become a mobile device also. 
As both the bandwidth and the computing power of the mobile device will be 
highly increased, we can foresee that more applications that required high bandwidth 
and high security level can be implemented using the 3G technologies. Commercial 
activities can be enhanced into Rich Media Mobile Commerce based on the 3G 
foundation. 
3.4 Payment Systems used in E-commerce 
Nowadays there are various kinds of payment systems used in e-commerce. We are 
going to introduce some of the most common payment systems. 
3.4.1 Electronic Cash 
This is the digital analogy to paper cash. It is an offline payment system, that is, no 
connection to the bank is required when doing electronic cash transaction. The main 
advantage of it is the untraceability of the e-cash. Unlike other payment systems, the 
receiver of the e-cash does not know whom the e-cash comes from. Neither the bank 
nor the merchant knows about the owner of the e-cash. Yet when a user double spends 
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the e-cash, the bank can catch him. 
We will talk more about e-cash on chapter 6. 
3.4.2 Credit Card 
This is the most common payment method used in doing e-commerce. The two major 
credit card companies include VISA International and Mastercard which makes up a 
large number of member banks. 
Credit Card is an online payment systems, that is, a three points connections is 
required — user, merchant and bank. In a POS counter, the owner of the credit card has 
to give his signature together with the card in order to prove that he is the owner of 
the card. But when it is used in the web payment, no signature is required. The owner 
only needs to type the credit card number as well as the expired date in the payment 
form. 
It is quite insecure because if the credit card number is captured by another 
person, this person can use that credit card to buy things on the web. Therefore, some 
security protocol is needed for the protection of the credit card holder, such as SSL 
[17] and SET [18]. 
3.4.3 Combined Payment System 
In the recently years, smart card technology grows rapidly. Some credit cards are now 
implemented on smart cards. They can integrate e-cash into it also. VisaCash'^^ is an 
example. Some “cash，，is rewarded and stored inside the smart card when the user 
uses this credit card for payment. The user can use this “cash，，next time he buys 
things using this credit card. 
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Chapter 4 
Introduction to Smart Card 
"The smart card is one of the latest additions to the world of information technology. 
Similar in size to today's plastic payment card, the smart card has a microprocessor 
or memory chip embedded in it. [21] ” In this chapter, we are going to discuss about 
this kind of pocket size computer, 
4.1 What is Smart Card? 
Smart card is a kind of plastic card which are classified into memory card and 
microprocessor card. Memory card simply just stores data into it. You can regard it as 
a small floppy disk. Microprocessor card contains a small processor, memory and an 
operating system such that it can not only store information, but also execute some 
programs. Some of them even have some built-in security features. All we are going 
to discuss here is about the latter — microprocessor smart card. 
Smart cards have two different kinds of interface: contact and contactless. 
Contact Smart Cards need to be inserted into a smart card reader, making physical 
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contact between the chips of the card and the reader in order to do any 
communications. Contactless Smart Cards contain an embedded antenna which allows 
the smart cards and the readers communicate in a wireless environment. 
4.2 Advantages of Smart Cards 
Smart cards become a new device widely used in the information technology world. 
We are now going to discuss what are the main advantages of using smart cards. 
4.2.1 Portable Device 
Smart Card is a really portable device. If you think that a notebook computer is 
already a portable device, then it seems that the smart card can be regarded as a part 
of your body! You can put it in your pocket and bring it everyday and everywhere. 
The size and weight are both negligible. 
4.2.2 Multi-applications 
Unlike a magnetic card, a smart card can store multi-applications instead of just one 
single application. In the past, you may have to bring many cards such as student 
identity card, library card, photocopy card, medical card etc. But if smart cards are 
used to replace these cards, just one single smart card is enough to implement all these 
kinds of applications. It is much more convenience for user and much more cheaper 
for the production cost. 
4.2.3 Computation Power 
As we have stated before, microprocessor smart cards contain a small CPU. It implies 
that smart cards are able to perform some calculations and programming. We can then 
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program the smart cards. We can give some instructions to the smart cards. Using this 
valuable feature, many different kinds of applications can be developed based on 
smart cards. 
4.2.4 Security Features 
For each smart card, there is a PIN which is only known to its owner. If the owner 
loses his smart card, no one else can use his card because they do not know the PIN. 
Besides, cryptographic algorithm such as encryption can be used in order to achieve a 
higher security level of the smart card. As stated above, smart cards are capable of 
doing program such as encryption and decryption so that the stored information can 
be transmitted without compromising confidentiality. 
4.3 What can Smart Cards Do? 
Smart cards play an important role in our daily life. Let us observe our surrounding 
environment and we can easily find out that there are really many occasions that we 
are using smart cards [22'. 
1. Wireless Communication — Every GSM mobile phone contains a SIM card. A 
SIM card is just a smart card without the plastic part! 
2. Transportation — Our Octopus card is a good example. It can be used to pay 
for many different kinds of transportation, such as bus, ferry, MTR, KCR, LRT. 
Besides, it can be also used to buy drinks in the drinks-automatic-selling 
machines. 
3. Banking and Payment - Mondex Card [23] is an electronic cash smart card. It 
can store e-cash. We can also transfer some money from our bank account to 
the Mondex Card. 
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4. Government ID Card — The new generation of citizen ID card will be a smart 
card combining identity card, driving license, passport etc. which makes life 
much simpler. 
These are only some examples. You can also find out more and more! This can 
prove that smart cards have already become part of our personal belongings. More 
importantly, smart cards are the necessary elements in the e-commerce world. 
4.4 Java Card 
Java is not only a programming language, but it is also a platform. A Java Card is a 
smart card which has embedded Java as its own platform. Developers can write Java 
program into it. It is a new concept of smart card. Now we are going to discuss the 
main advantages of this new-concept smart eard. 
1. Software and hardware independent: Java is a software-only platform that runs 
on top of other hardware-based platforms. In order words, Java program can 
be run on different kinds of operation system such as Windows98/2000, Linux, 
MacOS, and Solaris. That means we can communicate a Java Card with a 
machine running of these operation systems. There is no limitation of 
operation system on the terminal side. 
2. Web Browsers compatible: Web browsers (including Internet ExplorerTM and 
Netscape™) are all Java compatible. They are Java Virtual Machines and 
therefore can communicate with the Java Card. Furthermore, through this 
communication channel, the smart card can be used to develop application for 
the Internet. 
3. High Level programming language with Object-Oriented Property: Java is a 
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high level programming language. It is easy to develop and debug. Besides, its 
object-oriented property allows developers to add further application into the 
system without re-construct the whole system. This is very important in a fast 
growing IT environment. 
As the Java Card provide a channel for communications between the smart card 
and the Internet, many network applications can be developed using Java Card. For 
examples, E-mail security, SET-based Internet shopping and other kinds of cash 
replacement such as E-cash. Electronic tickets can also be brought from the web and 
store inside the smart card. 
In the next chapter, we will present a smart card certificate system. More 
specifically, our system employs elliptic curve cryptosystem as our public key 
algorithm and the smart card we choose is Java Card. 
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Chapter 5 
A New Smart Card Certificate 
System 
One of the main barriers to the development of multi-applications smart card is the 
limitation of the memory size and processing power. In this chapter, we are going to 
present a solution to it by using Elliptic Curve Cryptosytem (ECC) as the public key 
scheme. Based on the ECC, we also employ digital certificates for the whole system. 
Furthermore, our proposed system also supports multiple digital certificates for a 
smart card using the "Hyper-Link" concept. This is the foundation of other secure 
applications, such as e-banking. 
Here we first give an introduction and a brief overview of our system in section 1. 
In section 2，we give a comparison between RSA and ECC, followed by the system 
architecture in section 3. In section 4 we will analyze on the security of our system. 




Recently, smart card plays an important role in our daily life. It is a portable storage 
media. It is also a pocketsize computer. Multiple applications can be easily 
implemented into a smart card, even with security features. Anyone who has a smart 
card will be able to electronically and securely interact with several servers or service 
providers. We have also talked about the details of smart card in the last chapter. 
Security is one of the main concerns in the smart card system and cryptography 
is the foundation of data security. In the science of cryptography, there are 6 
primitives, namely symmetric cipher, asymmetric cipher, digital signature, message 
digest, zero-knowledge proof and digital certificate. A digital certificate is the highest 
level among the six. It contains the public key of the owner, which is signed by the 
Certificate Authority (CA) digitally. In order to verify a certificate, zero-knowledge 
proof will be used. 
However, if your certificate is stored on the computer of your office, then you 
cannot use it when you are at home. It is very inconvenience. It is more desirable if 
the certificate is stored in a portable media with processing power. Smart card is the 
media that can fulfill the above requirement. But the chip on the smart card is 
restricted in both memory and processing power. It is better to use a public-key 
cryptography such that it can provide the same level of security with the shortest key 
length possible. The Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) [7, 8] is the most desirable 
cryptography algorithm to do this task [10]. It can provide equivalent security but 
with shorter key lengths when compared with other existing public key schemes, such 
as the RSA Cryptosystem [6] which depends on the difficulty of factoring large 
integers, or the ElGamal Cryptosytem [24] which depends on the difficulty of 
computing discrete logarithms over finite fields. 
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This is the main reason that we employ ECC as the public-key algorithm used in 
the smart card system. In our system, the private key and public key pair are all 
generated inside the smart card. It can ensure that the private key never leaves the 
card. The public key is then transmitted through the card reader to the CA. The CA 
puts the public key, together with the other information of the user, into a digital 
certificate. It also signs it digitally. The signed certificate is transmitted through the 
card reader into the smart card. We will talk about our system in detail in section 3. 
Furthermore, our smart card system employs Java as the smart card operation 
system. Java is a cross platform object oriented language which can increase the 
portability of our smart card system. 
5.2 Comparison between RSA and ECC 
The major advantage of ECC over RSA is ECC needs less computation than RSA but 
it still can achieve the same or even higher level of security. Table 5.1 [12] gives 
cost-equivalent key sizes. It gives the size, in bits, for equivalent keys. The time to 
break is computed assuming a machine can break a 56-bit DES key in 100 seconds, 
and then scaling accordingly. 
ECC Key ~RSA Key " l ime to Break Machines Memory 
112 430 < 5 minutes ^ Trivial 
160 760 600 months 4300 4 Gb 
3 million 114 170 Gb 
years  
256 1620 years .16 120 G ^ 
Table 5.1 
It can be seen that by using ECC, less bits can be used to maintain the same level 
of security. It implies that much less computation power is needed for ECC than RSA 
in order to achieve the same security level. 
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Implementation of public-key cryptography in a smart card has numerous 
limitations. The two major limitations are constrained memory and limited computing 
power. Any addition to memory or processing capacity increases the cost of each card. 
As we can see from above, ECC needs less computation power, thus it is more 
suitable than RSA in implementing public-key cryptography in a smart card. 
5.3 System Architecture 
In this section we are going to describe the system architecture in terms of 
cryptographic and practical implementation. 
5.3.1 System Setup 
In our basic system, there is a central Certificate Authority (CA) and a smart card user, 
Alice, who can be a student of a school, or a staff of a company, or a citizen of a 
country. In addition to it, there can be also more than one CA. For example, let the 
government be the central CA and the school can also be another CA. While at the 
same time, Alice can be the student of the school and the citizen of the country. 
Each CA should have its own setup parameters which are as follow: 
1. Find a curve y^ = x^ + ax + b over Fg. (or over F”） 
2. Find a point G = (x。，y。）such that Order(G) = p which is a large prime number. 
(Order(G) is defined as p such that pG = O ) 
3. CA has its private key s and public key S. 
4. The Curve( C ), the integer q and the point G are known to everyone and can be 
shared by multiple users. 
After that, the CA is said to be ready and welcome for user to apply for a 
certificate. 
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5.3.2 Apply for a certificate 
If a user wants to apply for a certificate, the following steps are taken: 
1. If Alice wants to apply for a certificate, she has to come to the CA in person. 
This is needed because the CA needs to verify her identify. 
2. Alice has to type her personal information and password into the computer of 
the CA directly. 
3. The CA stores the data into the computer temporary. 
4. At this stage，the smart card is going to generate the key pair internally. The 
process is as follow: 
a. Randomly generate an integer s. 
b. Multiple s by the common point G, The resulting point S = sG '\s> the 
public key. 
By this way, the private key is never left the smart card. It is the most secure 
way for generating the private key. ( We will discuss the security issues of this 
in section 4 . ) 
5. After generating the key pair, the card outputs the public key (a EC point) to 
the CA server. 
6. Together with the Alice's information, such as her name, and her public key 
which is generated by the smart card, the CA uses its own private key to sign 
it. The signature scheme we use is called Elliptic Curve Nyberg-Rueppel 
Digital Signature. It works as follow: (which is also described in section 
2.5.2). 
a. l.Qtf=(PuhlicKeyAlice, Information a nee) which is going to be signed. 
b. Randomly generate a key pair ( u, V = uG). Let V 二 (Xy’ 少v). 
c. Calculate c = Xv + /(mod q ) and d = u - sc ( mod q ). {s is the private 
key ofCA.) 
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d. Output (c, d) as the signature. That is, 
SigncA(PublicKey Alice, Information Alice)=…，d) 
7. The certificate {PublicKeyAUce, InformationAUce. (c, d)} is then formed. After 
generating the certificate, the CA copies the certificate into the smart card. 
5.3.3 Authentication of Alice 
Most of the applications need to authenticate a user. For example, if Alice wants to go 
into her lab which only allow students of her department to go inside. Here is the 
procedure for the authentication of Alice: 
1. Alice presents the smart card to the terminal. 
2. She has to type her PIN in order to get the access. 
3. If the PIN is correct, the terminal asks for her certificate. 
4. Alice (her smart card) sends the certificate to the terminal and it verifies it 
using CA's public key. The process is as follow: 
a. Calculate P = dG + cS ( c，d are received from Alice, G is the common 
point on the curve, ；S" is the public-key the CA.) Let P = {xp, yp). 
b. Calculate f = c-Xp{ mod q ) 
c. Accept it if and only i f / ' =f. 
5. The terminal randomly generates an integer x and requests Alice (her smart 
card) to sign it using her own private key. 
6. Alice (her smart card) signs it and sends it back to the terminal 
7. The terminal verifies it using Alice's public key extracted from her certificate, 
(the signature algorithm is described in section 2.5.2). 
8. The terminal will only accept Alice if she can pass the verification. 
The verification process can be illustrated by the following diagram: 
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The private Alice c^ i f ica te Read the card to get the 
key is stored — ^ ^ certificate, verify it. If 
inside the OK, then extract the 
smart card. public key from the cert. 
^ ^ Random generate x, 
^ request to sign x, 
Sign X (using the algo 
describe in section  
output (c,d). Verify using Alice's 
public key. 
Figure 5.1 
This is called the zero-knowledge proof because Alice can prove she knows her 
private-key without revealing it. 
5.3.4 Other Certificates - the "Hyper-Link" concept 
The main certificate (for example, given by the government) of Alice is stored inside 
the card. Then how about her other certificates? Digital certificate is very common 
and a user may have many certificates. A bank can give certificate to its customer. A 
school can give certificate to the students. Even a "dot-com" can also give certificate 
to its user. It is difficult to store every certificate inside the smart card because the 
memory of a smart card is very limited. In our proposed system, we employ the 
concept of "Hyper-Link". These other certificates will be stored elsewhere instead of 
the smart card. These certificates are only needed when you are doing web browsing 
or on-line shopping. Therefore we put these certificates in a web server. Only the 
URLs will be stored inside the smart card. If a particular certificate is needed, just go 
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to the URL and download the required certificate. It is similar to a "Hyper-Link" in 
the HTML language. 
It is very clear that the size of a “URL hyper-link" is extremely small when 
comparing to a certificate. By this way, even a smart card can store up to a thousand 
of "URL hyper-link" of certificate. It will be much better to put each certificate into 
more than one web server. If one of the web servers is out of service, we can still go 
to other web servers to download the certificate. 
5.3.4.1 Generation of the “hyper-link” 
It is the same as the process 1 to 6 of section 5.3.2. But for this time, the certificate is 
not stored on the smart card. Instead, the CA uploads the certificate to its web 
server(s). It then sends the URL hyper-link(s) of the certificate back to the smart card 
for storage. We can also notice that although the certificate is stored somewhere else, 
the private key corresponding to that certificate is still stored inside the smart card. 
5.3.4.2 Authentication of Alice using the “hyper-link，， 
It is almost the same as the authentication process using the main certificate, which is 
described in section 5.3.3. But after Alice has typed her PIN correctly (after execute 
process 1 — 3 in section 5.3.3), the terminal reads the hyper-link of the required 
certificate. It downloads the certificate from it. After getting it, then the remaining 
process is the same as process 4 — 8 in section 5.3.3. 
There is a tradeoff of the "hyper-link". As you can see that the terminal has to 
download the required certificate from the web, the terminal should have a connection 
to the Internet. Therefore, off-line terminal cannot employ this mode of service. 
However, there are still many on-line occasions that allow Alice to use her 
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"hyper-links", such as on-line shopping on the web. 
5.3.5 Multiple Applications 
Based on these security modules, we can build up the entire smart card system which 
consists of many applications. Here we present some of the most important 
applications in our proposed system. 
1. Digital Signature 
Digital Signature is similar to handwritten signature, but instead of signing a paper 
document, digital signature is used to sign an electronic document. 
A digital signature is necessary in all the activities in the e-commerce world. 
When Alice wants to sign a document or send an email with her signature, she has to 
use her private key to do so. The private key is stored inside the smart card. It never 
leaves the card. But if the whole document is transferred to the smart card to be 
signed, it is not practical because of the limited memory of the smart card. Instead of 
the whole document, we make the message digest of the document using a one-way 
hash function, such as SHA-1. The size of the resulting data is only 160 bits. 
2. Encryption 
Sometimes Alice wants to encrypt a document before sending to Bob. Before doing so, 
Alice has to get the public key of Bob. What she has to do is just asking Bob to send 
her his own certificate. If he wants to use his main certificate which is stored in his 
smart card, then he has to send it from his smart card directly. If he wants to use other 
certificate, he just needs to send Alice the corresponding hyper-link and ask Alice to 
download from this specific URL. 
After getting the public key of Bob, Alice can use it to develop a secret key with 
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Bob using some key-exchange algorithm, such as Diffie-Hellman key-exchange [16: 
(described in section 2.8). Then she can use this derived secret key to encrypt the 
document. At the other side, Bob can also use this secret key to decrypt the document. 
3. Online Applications 
Java is a cross platform language. More importantly, web browsers can also support 
Java. It implies that our Java Card can be used compatible with many web-based 
applications, such as on-line shopping or e-banking service. Furthermore, more 
applications can be added to the card just by downloading applets into it. The new 
applets can be put on some web sites and let users to download them through the 
reader into the smart card. This is a great advantage. Users do not need to bring back 
their smart card to the card center or administrator in order to add more applications 
into it. They can do it by themselves at their home or office. 
4. Off-line Applications 
Although all the off-line applications required the main certificate, there are still many 
different kinds of applications that can be developed, such as a door lock system (or 
restricted area access system), self photocopy service, library record and facility 
booking system. Besides, off-line e-cash protocol such as [25, 26, 27] can be 
integrated into it as well. 
5.4 Security Analysis 
Security is a very important matter in all smart card system and it is also what we 
want to emphasis in our system. We now discuss some of the security issues. 
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5.4.1 No Crypto-processor is needed 
Although there are some smart cards which contain higher level of security features, 
they have two processors. One is the CPU and the other is the crypto-processor. The 
price is definitely higher than the general-purpose smart card used in our system. By 
the way, the US law also restricts the export of these kinds of security products to the 
area outside US. It is a great barrier to develop a secure multi-purpose smart card 
system. 
We use ECC instead of RSA in our general-purposes smart card system. As a 
result, the memory and computation power requirement is much lower. Multiple 
applications which require high security level can be integrated into the same smart 
card. 
5.4.2 PIN Protect 
The smart card is PIN protected. If Alice has lost her smart card, other people cannot 
use it because they do not know the PIN of her smart card. If anyone types the wrong 
PIN in 3 consecutive times, the card will be locked automatically. Only the central CA 
can un-lock the card. This is to prevent someone who wants to guess the PIN by trial 
and error method. 
5.4.3 Digital Certificate Protect 
Inheriting from digital signature, digital certificate also has the unforgeable property. 
As the digital certificate is signed by the CA, no one else can forge a certificate by 
pretending the CA to sign it. Besides, the zero-knowledge proof can prevent other 
people from stealing Alice's certificate. If Carol has stolen Alice's certificate, she 
cannot pass the zero-knowledge proof because she does not have Alice's private key. 
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5.4.4 Private Key is never left the smart card 
We can see that in either the process of generation of key pair and the process of 
authentication of the user, the private key is never left the card. In the encryption and 
decryption process, we do not directly use the private and public key to do encryption 
or decryption. Instead we use key exchange algorithm to develop a secret key first. 
The key exchange algorithm can be taken place inside the smart card. After that, the 
encryption and decryption process which require a lot of computation power can be 
done by the computer instead of the smart card. In this way, the private key is still not 
needed to be given to other computer. 
5.5 Extensions 
There are several extensions that can be-made to our system. Here we are going to 
discuss some of the major extensions. 
5.5.1 Biometrics Security 
Some biometrics security features such as fingerprint authentication can be added to 
the smart card system. The fingerprint of the owner of the smart card can be stored 
inside the smart card. If an authentication station wants to check the fingerprint of a 
user, a fingerprint reader is needed. In addition to the digital certificate and the PIN, 
this is the third level of protection. 
5.5.2 E-Voting 
Voting using your own computer is not just a proposal. At March, 2000, "With the 
click of a computer mouse, Arizona Democrats made U.S. history by becoming the 
first Americans to use the Internet to cast ballots in a legally binding election. “ [28 . 
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In the election of U.S. President at the end of 2000, there was a dispute of the result. 
The dispute mainly came from some paper tickets. Using e-voting can surely avoid 
such argument. According to a survey at the end of December 2000, by 
Stamford-based Gartner Group, Inc., Americans are generally willing to use Intemet-
or email-related technologies for voting. [29' 
Our proposed system can be extended to support e-voting, not only in the user's 
own computer, but the user can go to other places to vote, provided that there is a 
smart card reader attached. It is also assumed that the community is supported by a 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), where each voter possesses a public-private key pair 
and one can generate a liable digital signature with his own private key. We can see 
that a smart card has the ability to fulfill this requirement: The whole system is a PKI. 
There is a certificate stored inside the smart card. Furthermore, the smart card also has 
possessing power to give a digital signature. 
Due to the portability of smart card, users can vote wherever they want. They can 
stay at home. They can stay at office. Even they are not in their own country, they still 
can vote through the Internet. In fact, it makes no different. This is a great advantage 
over traditional voting. As a result, using smart card as the e-voting tools, it can be 
sure that the voting rate will be increased. More importantly, dispute such as those in 
the U.S. Presidential Election in 2000 will not be happened if using e-voting. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Smart card is not only a portable storage media, but also a small processing unit. 
Based on this special property, smart card is a suitable device to develop security 
system. But one of the main barriers which has been described above is the limitation 
of the memory and processing power. Using Elliptic Curve can solve the problem. 
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Besides, as Java is a cross platform language and it can be run by web browsers, it 
acts as a bridge between the Java smart card and the Internet. Furthermore, the 
"Hyper-Link" concept allows the user the store many certificate in one single smart 
card. Based on this security authentication tool, many applications can be developed. 
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Chapter 6 
Introduction to Electronic Cash 
Money is a great invention that makes much of modem life possible. People cannot 
work in an environment without a standard way to trade goods and services. This 
theory applies in the digital world also. The Internet is just like another convenient 
way to place an order and complete a transaction. And Electronic Cash is just like the 
digital analogy of cash. 
In this chapter, we are going to discuss about this new form of electronic 
payment. 
6.1 Introduction 
The first proposal of using numbers to represent coins was made by David Chaum [13； 
in 1983. According to his paper, an electronic cash system consists of electronic coins 
which are numbers. However, the concept of currency that exists in format other than 
paper and coins has been expressed as early as 1888 in Edward Bellamy's book 
Looking Backward [30]. In that book, cash was replaced by pasteboard and are 
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hole-punched at each transaction. Until now, there are more than hundreds of 
proposed electronic cash systems. Some of them are even being used in the real 
market. We will talk about these products at the last section of this chapter. 
E-cash systems generally fall into the following categories: debit-based, 
credit-based, ATM-based, hybrid, and other innovative models. But here, we focus 
our attention only on debit-based e-cash protocols. 
In an online e-cash system, during a transaction, three parties are involved. 
Customer-bank or merchant-bank on-line connection is required. In an offline e-cash 
system, the only parties involved are the payer and the payee. Cut-and-choose is a 
technique commonly used in early e-cash protocols to achieve untraceability. But it is 
cumbersome and may be a security liability. Later e-cash protocols use single-term 
technique where there are only a few terms in a coin. It is more efficient and practical. 
6.2 The Basic Requirements 
As we have stated above, we can regard e-cash as the digital implementation of paper 
cash. Therefore its requirements are also very similar to paper cash. According to [26], 
in the ideal e-cash system, it has six main properties: 
1. Independence — The security of the electronic cash cannot depend on any 
physical condition, such as the hardware protection. It can only depend on 
itself. 
2. Security — The electronic cash cannot be copy, reuse, forged or double spent. 
Anyone who has processed these cheating activities can be caught. 
3. Privacy — The privacy of the user should be protected. That is, no one should 
be able to trace the relationship between the user and his purchases. User 
anonymity should be provided. It implies the electronic cash is untraceable. 
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4. Off-line payment — When a user pays electronic cash to a shop, the only 
parties involved are the payer and the payee. That is, no customer-bank or 
merchant-bank on-line connection is required. 
5. Transferability — The electronic cash can be transferred from one user to 
another user. 
6. Divisibility — The piece of electronic cash can be subdivided into many pieces 
such that the total amount of all the pieces should be equal to the amount of 
the original electronic cash. 
In fact, there are only very little e-cash protocols that can fulfill all the six 
requirements. Most of the protocols are selectively fulfill. 
6.3 Advantages of Electronic Cash over other kinds of 
payment systems 
Nowadays there exists many kinds of electronic payment systems. They include credit 
card, debit card (or called pre-paid card) and e-cash. In this section we are going to 
discuss the advantages of using e-cash over other kinds of electronic payments. 
6.3.1 Privacy 
In the credit card payments, user identity is revealed when you give your credit card 
or credit card number to the shop. The shop has to check the validity of it from the 
bank. The bank also has the record of each transaction. The information includes the 
date of each transaction, the amount and the items of things or services the user buys 
each time, the name of the merchant etc. It seems that the bank knows everything 
about the credit card and its transaction. No privacy can be maintained. In the 21'^  
century, the request of privacy is increasing everywhere. Therefore, it is better for an 
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electronic payment that can maintain the privacy of the user. 
Electronic Cash has the total advantage of privacy over credit card. When a user 
uses electronic cash for his payment, it is done in an anonymous way. No one knows 
the identity of the e-cash. Even the bank does not know who owns the e-cash. Yet if 
the user does some cheating behaviour such as double spend the e-cash, the bank can 
find it out and catch the cheating user. In other words, the identity of the e-cash owner 
will not be reveal unless the owner double spend it. It is just like in geometry, when 
you are given only one point, you cannot find the equation of the line. But when you 
are given two points on the same line, you are able to find out the equation of the line. 
In fact, e-cash protocols also employ this concept. 
6.3.2 Off-line payment 
If you want to make a credit card payment, there should be an online-connection 
made between the merchant and the bank. It is needed for checking the validity of the 
card and the account. It is not convenience because you cannot use your credit card 
for the places where there is no connection to the bank, such as in the street. In this 
case, e-cash has a total advantage over credit card. There is no need for any 
connection made for each transaction of e-cash. The shop only needs to deposit the 
e-cash at the end of each day, or every two, three... days. 
6.3.3 Suitable for Small Amount Payment 
Each time when you make a credit card payment, the credit card company will charge 
you a certain amount of fee, although most of the time, this charges are paid by the 
shop, instead of the customer. This charge is negligible if you want to buy a large 
amount of goods or services. However, if you just want to make a few dollars or even 
fifty cents payment, this charge becomes a large portion when compares with the total 
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amount you have to pay. Therefore, many shops only allow customers to use credit 
card payment when they buy more than a certain amount of goods, such as HK$50 or 
HK$100. If customers just want to buy HK$10 of goods, they are not allowed to use 
credit card. 
There is a kind of electronic cash which are designed for payments of small 
amount. This is called micropayment. For the design of micropayment protocol, high 
efficiencies are required so that the transaction cost becomes in-significant. This can 
be achieved by giving up some of the security requirements such as anonymity. Yet it 
is very popular since it is much faster and much more convenience. The Octopus of 
the Hong Kong transportation system is a good example, although it is not exactly 
micropayment system, but the idea and the concept is the same. Credit card payment 
is not suitable for the case you pay for the bus fee. 
6.4 Basic Model of Electronic Cash 
As we have stated before, there are many papers of e-cash protocol. In this section, we 
choose [15] to give a brief introduction of the e-cash protocol because it is a very 
significant paper in the history of e-cash. Although it is hardly practical, it builds the 
foundation of off-line e-cash protocol. 
The protocol consists of three phases, namely the cash withdrawal phase, the 
spending phase and the deposit phase. At the cash withdrawal phase, the bank verifies 
that the user's identity is embedded in a randomly created coin. This is done in the 
zero-knowledge manner by using the cut-and-choose method (described in section 
2.7). The bank then issues a blind signature (described in section 2.6) on the coin. At 
the spending phase, the user provides a distinct piece of "information" on his identity, 
such that one piece of such information provides unconditionally blinding on the 
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user's identity. However, any two pieces of such information can reveal the identity of 
the user. At the deposit phase, the shop transfers a payment transcript to the bank. If 
the bank finds out that there is double spending of a coin, the bank can identify the 
user because the identity of the user is revealed by the two distinct "information" on 
it. 
6.5 Examples of Electronic Cash 
In this section we are going to introduce some e-cash examples that are brought into 
real markets. 
6.5.1 eCash 
eCash [31]，former named as DigiCash, isr formed by David Chaum. Now it is sold to 
eCash Technologies. It provides business-to-business (B2B), person-to-person (P2P) 
electronic payments solutions to customers. Besides, it also provides solutions for 
mobile commerce and beyond. More and more financial institutions join the 
partnership of eCash. 
6.5.2 Mondex 
Formally speaking, Mondex [23] cannot be regarded as e-cash because the security of 
Mondex is depend heavily on the hardware security instead of the algorithm. But the 
concept is very similar to e-cash, and we can also talk about it here. 
It is like a prepaid card. The system operates on a smart card which store the 
"cash" on a microchip. It also allow divisibility and transferability. You can debit 
$100 and spend $0.1. You can also transfer $30 into your friend's Mondex card using 
the transfer machine. Therefore you can regard it as an electronic purse, You can add 
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money into it in any Mondex-supported ATM machine from your bank account. 
6.5.3 Octopus Card 
Octopus Card is a kind of prepaid card. It is used in Hong Kong transportation 
systems, including buses, ferry, MTR, KCR, mini-bus etc. Now you can also use it in 
buying drinks, dialing telephone and other kinds of services. We choose Octopus Card 
to be discussed because there is one valuable property that this system has. One of the 
applications of my thesis is motivated from the idea of this property. It is 
recoverability. 
There are two kinds of Octopus Card. One is general Octopus Card and the other 
is personal Octopus Card. Recoverability can only be done on personal Octopus Card. 
If Alice has brought a personal Octopus Card, and has already added $100 into the 
card. When she has lost it, after reporting and providing her information to the 
Octopus office, she can get back the money in her lost card. 
Yet it cannot be regarded as e-cash formally also. But the idea of the 
recoverability is highly appreciate. 
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Chapter 7 
A New Recoverable and 
Untraceable Electronic Cash 
Recoverability and untraceability are two obviously conflicting properties. Most of 
the e-cash papers such as [25, 26, 27] do not include recoverability. Although the 
e-cash system in [32] contains recovery, it is an on-line e-cash system. In this paper, 
we introduce a new e-cash protocol which possesses these two properties 
simultaneously. At the same time, it still remains off-line. 
We first give a brief introduction in section 1, The basic idea of our proposed 
protocol is presented in section 2. In section 3, we are going to give the brief 
description of S. Brand's Single Term E-cash Protocol [27] in which our proposed 
protocol is motivated. In section 4, we give the detail explanation of our protocol, 
followed by the analysis of the security in section 5. Certain Extensions will be 
discussed in section 6. Conclusion will be done on the last section. 
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7.1 Introduction 
In the ideal e-cash system [26], it has six main properties: Independence, Security, 
Privacy (Untraceability), Off-line payment, Transferability and Divisibility. Most of 
the previous papers focus on these areas and provide improvement on these topics. 
But even using an ideal e-cash system, the user will loss all his e-cash if the computer 
has crashed and all the files are removed accidentally, or his e-cash wallet, for 
example, a smart card, has been lost. In the latter case, if someone else finds this 
wallet, he can spend all the remaining e-cash in a normal way. This situation will not 
be happened if the user uses his credit card to go on-line shopping. If the user losses 
his credit card, or recognizes his credit card has been stolen, he can report to the bank 
so that the credit card becomes invalid at the same moment. But for each transaction 
the user makes should be online, that is, a three-party connection has to be setup. At 
the same time the user's anonymity will be lost. Both the shop and the bank can gel 
the identity of the user. We have already discussed it in the last chapter. 
In this chapter, we are going to propose a new protocol that can lake the 
advantages of both electronic payments. That is, this is an off-line e-cash system that 
can support untraceable payment, yet it also supports recoverable. That means even if 
a user losses his e-cash wallet, after reporting to the bank, he can get back his 
lost-money. In our scheme, untraceability can be maintained. 
Our new system can be regarded as an extension to an existing e-cash system, 
such as [25, 27]. It is compatible with most of the basic e-cash system, provided that 
the e-cash is not divisible and transferable. 
7.2 The Basic Idea 
In this section, we will give the basic idea behind our recovery protocol that allows 
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users to recover from their lost coins. 
If a user losses his e-wallet, or his hard disk gets corrupted accidentally, it is very 
difficult to find out the exact amount he has lost, unless he has found his lost wallet, 
or recovered his e-cash files. In our protocol, instead of finding it out directly, we use 
an indirect method. If we know the total amount of e-cash the user withdrawn from 
the bank, as well as the total amount he has spent, the difference of these two numbers 
is the answer that we want to know. In other words, 
How much e-cash lost 
=How much e-cash withdrawn — How much e-cash spent 
Let us have a simple example. If Alice has withdrawn $100 e-cash from the bank, 
and she has spent $70. Then she lost the remaining e-cash. It can be calculated that 
she has lost $30 ($100- $70 二 $30 ). 
If we give up untraceability, it is very easy to do so. By using a large database， 
all the transaction activities are recorded, including the identity of each user and how 
much e-cash they spend. However, the situation becomes more complex if we want to 
maintain untraceability. In this case, the bank does not know how much e-cash each 
user spends, provided that the user does not double spend his money. 
In our protocol, we append an additional number to every e-coin. This 
additional number reveals nothing about the identity of the user. Therefore the 
anonymity of user can be maintained. If the user lost his e-cash, he only needs to 
present another number to the bank, then the bank can find out how much e-cash he 
has spent. 
How about if the user pretends he has lost his e-cash, and wants to claim back 
the money, but in fact he does not loss it? In our protocol, we have a mechanism to 
prevent this kind of cheating. 
The details of this protocol will be described in section 7.4. 
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7.3 S. Brand's Single Term E-cash Protocol 
Our proposed system is motivated from S. Brand's Single Term E-cash protocol [27], 
therefore hereby we are going to give a brief introduction of his protocol first. 
7.3.1 The Setup of the System 
The setup of the system consists of 万，the bank, U, the customer and S, the shop. The 
bank also setups two databases: one is called account database which is used to store 
information about account-holders; the other is called deposit database which is used 
to store information from deposited payment transcripts. 
Le tp , q, g, gi, g2 be system parameters published by the bank where the order of 
g, gi and g2 is q. Let x be the secret key of the bank and h = g" mod p be the public 
key of the bank. Let uj be the secret key of the customer and I = g广 mod p be the 
identity of the customer. B computes z = (Ig�/ modp and transmits it to U. 
7.3.2 The Withdrawal Protocol 
If U wants to withdraw a coin, he has to identify himself first, for example, digitally 
sign a request for withdrawal, or type in the correct password of his account. After 
that, the following steps are performed: 
1. B generates a random number w and sends a = g"" modp and b = (Igzf 動dp 
to U. 
2. U generates three random numbers s, xi and and computes A = (Igz/ modp, 
B = mod p and z ' = z^  mod p. U also generates two more random 
numbers u and v and uses them to compute a' = modp and b' = b^^'A" 
mod p. He also compute the challenge c, = H(A，B,z', a', b') mod p where H 
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is an one-way collision free hash function. After that, U sends the blinded 
challenge c = c'/u mod q to B. 
3. B sends the response r = cx + w mod q to U and debits his account. 
4. U accepts it if and only if / = h'a mod p and (Ig?/ 二 z(.b mod p. If it holds, 
then U computes r '=ru + v mod q, 
5. As a result of this protocol, U obtains the following quantities: 
A, B, sign(A, B) 
where sign(A, B) 二 {z’’ a，’ b’’ r’}. The verification checks the following: 
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g''三Z/f (3丨mod p 
A'' modp 
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7.3.3 The Payment Protocol 
When [/wants to spend his coin at shop S, the following protocol is performed: 
1. U sends A, B, sign (A, B) to S. 
2. If A ^ I, then S computes the challenge d = Ho(A, B, Is, date/time), where 
date/time is the number representing date and time of the transaction and Is is 
the identity of the shop S. H�is another one-way collision free hash function. S 
sends d to U, 
3. U computes the responses rj 二 d(UjS) + xj mod q and n 二 ds + x； mod q and 
sends them back to S. 
4. S accepts if and only sign(A, B) is a signature on (A, B) and 容/'g广 modp 
=A^B mod p. 
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7.3.4 The Deposit Protocol 
After some time (for example, at the end of each day), S sends B the payment 
transcript, consisting of 丄 B, sign(A’ B), (n ’r2) and date/time of the transaction. The 
following protocol is performed by the bank: 
1. If A = 1 ,the B does not accept the payment transcript. 
2. Otherwise, B compute d by itself using the information provided by the shop. 
3. B verify g / ' g / ' modp 二 A^B modp and sign(A, B) is a signature on (A, B). If 
not both valid, then B does not accept the payment. 
4. B then searches its deposit database to find out whether A has been stored 
before. 
5. If A has not been stored before, then B stores (A, data/time, n, n_ ) in the 
deposit database deposited by S and credits the account of 
6. If A has been deposited before, that means a fraud has been occurred. If the 
previous transcript was deposited by S and the date/time are the same as the 
newly deposited transcript, that means S is trying to deposit the same 
transcript twice. Otherwise, the coin has been double-spent. 
7. If the coin has been double-spent, B can use the following equations to find 
out the identity of the user who has double-spent: 
a. Let (d’ r；, r�)be the newly deposited payment transcript and ( d n ’’ r：') 
be the previous deposited payment transcript. 
b. Compute — ？J … = � 
厂2 -厂2 s{ji - a ) 
c. Compute / = g,"' modp which is the identity of the user who has 
double-spent. 
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7.4 The Proposed Protocol 
In this section, we will describe our protocol part by part, namely the withdrawal 
protocol, the payment protocol, the deposit protocol and the recovery protocol. We 
assume Alice is the user that has lost her e-cash and wants to get recovered. Here we 
use [27] as our basic e-cash system as well as the notation, which we have described 
in the last section already. 
7.4.1 The Withdrawal Protocol 
In our protocol, there are totally 4 parties involved, namely the Bank, user Alice, the 
shop and the Trusted Third Party (TTP). After Alice has withdrawn e-cash from the 
bank, she got the coin {A, B’ sign(A, B) }, after executed the protocol described in 
section 7.3.2. Then the following protocol-is performed: 
1. She goes to the TTP to get an additional number, x/, for each coin, for 1 <i <n. 
(We assume there are total n coins.) This additional number has the following 
properties: 
H(xi) = H(X2) 二H(X3)..…=H(xn) = y 
where H( ) is an one way hashing function, such as MD-5 or SHA-1, and n is 
the number of coins withdrawn by Alice at this time. 
2. The TTP should maintain a list that records down all the serial number of the 
coins ( in this case, it is the number A ) which have been processed. Every 
time when a user presents his coins, the TTP should check whether these coins 
have been processed or not. If the list contains the serial number of the coin, 
the TTP should terminate the process. 
3. If the coin is not in the list, the TTP then checks the signature sign(A,B) on (A, 
B). If it is a valid signature, it gives another signature for each coin. The 
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signature should include the additional number. Let Sc 二 Signrri){ A, B, Sign(A, 
B), Xi}. Sc should be attached to the coin. Now the coin contains the following 
items: {A, B, Sign (A, B), xt, Sc}. 
4. The T I P gives another signature on y and n. Let St = Signrrp{y, n }. St will be 
given to Alice. Alice should keep {Sb , y, n} in a save place. They are used to 
recovery her lost coins. 
Also note that although the TTP records down the serial number of the coin, the 
coin is still untraceable because the TTP knows nothing about the owner of the coin. 
7.4.2 The Payment Protocol 
When Alice wants to spend her coin at the Shop, the following payment protocol is 
performed; 
1. The basic payment protocol based on [27], also described in section 7.3.3. 
2. The shop checks also the signature of the TTP. That is, to check if Sc is a valid 
signature of {A, B, Sign(A, B)’ Xi}. 
3. The shop hashes the Xi of the coin to produce its hash value. Then it checks 
whether the coin is in the blacklist (A blacklist is a list containing the hash 
value of the x, of all the lost coins.). The shop accepts the transaction only if it 
is not in the blacklist. 
7.4.3 The Deposit Protocol 
At the end of each day, the shop sends the payment transcript to the bank. The 
transcript should contain Xi also. This is similar to the deposit protocol of [27], which 
is also described in section 7.3.4. In additional to the checking procedure, the bank 
further checks whether the hash value of Xi of each coin is in the blacklist. (The bank 
should also maintain a blacklist.). The bank does not accept any coins with their hash 
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value in the blacklist. 
7.4.4 The Recovery Protocol 
In the previous sub-section, we have mentioned the withdrawal, payment and deposit 
protocol. Here we will present the most important part of our system, the recovery 
protocol. 
If Alice has lost her remaining coins, she has to do the following: 
1. She has to reveal her identity to the bank. She also has to present the back-up 
number {Sb,y,n} to the bank. 
2. The bank checks the signature of Sb on {y, n}. 
3. If the signature is valid, the bank looks up its database to find out all the coins 
with their hashed values of are equal to y. The maximum number of such 
coins should be n. These coins are those Alice has already spent. 
4. The bank can calculate the difference D between the total amount Alice has 
withdrawn and the total amount she has spent. D is the amount that Alice has 
lost. 
In order to prevent Alice pretend losing the coins but in fact she does not, the 
following steps must be taken immediate after she has reported her lost coins to the 
bank: 
1. The bank adds the number 少 to the blacklist and broadcast it to all the shops. 
2. The shop adds this y to the blacklist. If any customer uses any coin with the 
hashed value of x/ is equal to y, the shop should not accept this transaction 
because this coin has been either lost or stolen. 
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7.5 Security Analysis 
In this section we analyze on the security of our system. 
7.5.1 Conditional Untraceability 
Untraceability is maintained in our protocol. We can see that neither the TTP nor the 
bank knows about the identity of the coin. If Alice does not double spend, her identity 
is never revealed. However, if Alice looses her coins and wants to get recovery, she 
has to reveal her identity to the bank. But it is the one and only one case that the 
user's untraceability is lost provided that the user does not double spend. 
7.5.2 Cheating 
Alice may cheat by herself or with a dishonest shop in the following ways: 
Case 1: Alice may claim that she has lost her coins, yet she does not. 
Our protocol cannot prevent this happen. But when Alice gets back her 
recovered coins, she cannot spend her original coins, because they are all blacklisted. 
Case 2: The dishonest shop may hold the coins of Alice, and does not deposit them 
until Alice has reported she has lost her coins. It seems that Alice can get more than 
she has lost. 
But in fact it is not the case. If the shop delays the deposit of the coins, the bank 
will not accept them because they have already been blacklisted. 
7.6 Extension 
Based on the above basic system, there can be some extension to improve the system 
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in different ways: 
Extension 1: 
The system can be extended to a more practical manner. As the cost of finding those x, 
such that 
H(xi) = H(X2) = H(X3) • .…=H(xn) 二 y 
is not low, the TTP may charge Alice. At the same time, Alice can also choose not to 
"buy" such insurance service. In this case, the TTP just put 0 for all the value of x/,少 
and n. No more modification is needed. By doing this way，the system become more 
economical and reasonable. 
Extension 2: 
As finding the Xi is quite time consuming, the TTP can produce many groups of Xij 
such that 
H ( X i , j ) = H(X2, j ) = H ( X 3 , j ) . . … 二 H(Xn, j ) = y j . 
When f customer come, the TTP can give the f group number to him. This is just 
like to do some pre-calculation and it can greatly save the time of a customer spent in 
the TTP. 
Extension 3: 
As the output of the hash function is a constant length integer, there is a finite number 
of outputs. After all the output integers have been used up (or nearly used up), the 
system (or the bank) needs to renew all the coins. 
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7.7 Conclusion 
We have presented an e-cash protocol that can support both untraceability and 
recoverability. Certain tradeoffs are necessary, as discussed above. Our protocol has 
been motivated by the single-term offline untraceable e-cash protocols in [25, 27 , 
We have made significant innovations in order to compromise the conflict between 
untraceability and recoverability. There still remains many open topics for future 




In this thesis, two aspects of e-commerce are discussed: security of e-commerce and 
payment method used in e-commerce. We started from the brief describing of the 
development of e-commerce: the generation is PC-based, the generation is 
mobile-based, which is called m-commerce, and the generation is 3G-based, which 
is called rich media m-commerce. But we can see that in any stage of the development, 
security is also the main concern. In Chapter 4, we looked at the smart card at a 
detailed level. The nature of smart card and the advantages of using smart card are 
discussed. We also introduced a new kind of smart card 一 the Java Card. It is a Java 
based smart card such that we can use Java to program the card. We have employed 
the Java Card in our proposed system which is discussed in Chapter 5, 
Our proposed system is a Smart Card Certificate System using Elliptic Curve 
Cryptosystem as the public key algorithm. The main advantage of using elliptic curve 
cryptosystem is its low computation power requirement. It is most suitable to be used 
in smart card. Based on the ECC, various kinds of security features can be developed, 
such as multiple certificates system. To store certificates in a portable device such as 
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smart card is the most convenience way in the e-commerce world. Yet due to the 
limitation of computing power and memory of smart card, it seems a little bit difficult 
to implement it. Our proposed system solves this problem by using ECC. Besides, we 
also use the "Hyper-Link" concept to store multiple certificates on a single smart card. 
By using this, the security of doing e-commerce activities can be highly increased. 
Payment system is another concern of e-commerce. Traditionally, credit card 
payment is generally used. However, many people are afraid to give their credit 
number into the web because if it is known by other people, they can use it to go 
on-line shopping such that the owner of the credit card does not know it until the date 
when he receives the bill. Besides, it seems there is no privacy for using credit card. 
Every transaction is recorded by the bank. Recently, there exists another kind of 
payment system — electronic cash. It is the digital analogy of paper cash. Therefore it 
can support anonymity. Privacy can be preserved. It is also an off-line payment. We 
have given an overview of e-cash in Chapter 6. 
Most of the previous papers focus on the 6 main properties of e-cash: 
Independence, Security, Privacy, Off-line, Transferability and Divisibility. In this 
thesis, we proposed a new concept of e-cash: Recoverable. It means that if an user has 
lost his e-cash, he can get it back. It is very easy to achieve this if we give up 
anonymity. But in our proposed system, both anonymity and recoverability can be 
achieved. 
To conclude, e-commerce will continue to grow. It can be seen that smart card 
will play a more important role in the coming years. At the same time, electronic cash 
also has great potential to become a major payment method in this information 
revolution. This thesis gives two contributions to these areas. 
Last but not least, we believe that e-commerce will not only limit to developed 
countries. People living in other developing countries will also have a taste of it. Our 
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daily life will become more digital, more comfortable, and more convenience. 
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Appendix 
Papers derived from this thesis 
[1] Joseph K. Liu, Victor K. Wei, C, Siu, Roy L. Chan, T Choi. “Multi-Application 
Smart Card with Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem Certificate'. Accepted for publication at 
EUROCON，July，2001. 
[2] Joseph K. Liu, Victor K. Wei, Sandy H. Wong. “Recoverable and Untraceable 
E-cash”. Accepted for publication at EUROCON, July, 2001. 
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